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A United Nations body has agreed for the first time that there are rules of the road in cyberspace that all nations should respect, even during peacetime, a senior State Department official tells POLITICO.

It’s a breakthrough for U.S. diplomats, who have been pushing these “norms” as an alternative to formal treaties as a way to help tame the lawless frontier of cyberspace.

 The norms agreed by the U.N.’s Group of Governmental Experts include understandings that nations should not intentionally damage each other’s critical infrastructure with cyberattacks; should not target each other’s cyber emergency responders; and should assist other nations investigating cyberattacks and cybercrime launched from their territories.

 

The next U.N. General Assembly must adopt the norms before they’re binding on nations — an endorsement that’s far from assured.

Still, it’s more likely they will be adopted by other international organizations or individual nations, the State Department official told POLITICO.

The Group of Governmental Experts “has tended to be the beacon, the framework that other states really look to for these types of issues,” the official said.

The norms are included in the consensus document produced by the panel of experts from 20 nations.

That report was sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon after the group completed its work last week and will be officially released in about six weeks after it’s been reviewed and translated, the official said.

Excluded from the consensus document was another U.S. proposal: One that sought to spell out the implications of a 2013 experts’ group agreement that international law generally applies in cyberspace just as it does on land or at sea.

That proposal was rebuffed by a bloc of nations — including Russia, China, Pakistan, Malaysia and Belarus — that argued the move would institutionalize U.S. hegemony in cyberspace, said James Lewis, the experts’ group rapporteur and director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Strategic Technologies Program.

Specifically, the U.S. wanted to include a reference to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force in self defense against an “armed attack” and would add legitimacy to a military response to a cyberattack that caused death and destruction.

“The Chinese line was ‘we don’t want to say Article 51, because that would militarize cyberspace and that’s a zone of peace,” Lewis said.

Unspoken, he said, was a concern that “the U.S. will use this to legitimize some kind of counteraction for things like OPM,” a reference to the breach of millions of federal employee records at the Office of Personnel Management that officials have anonymously attributed to China.

As a result of the objections, the experts’ group ultimately agreed to workaround language that endorsed the essence of Article 51 without referencing the document, Lewis said.

“There’s language in there that makes it clear that the right of self defense applies and you have to observe principles of [the Law of Armed Conflict] in doing it,” Lewis said. “Some of this was thinking of ways to say Article 51 without saying it.”

In general, Lewis said, the discussions were dogged by anger from Russia, China and other nations over non-cyber issues, including the U.S. use of drones to hunt terrorists abroad and, to a lesser extent, NSA surveillance.

“People say: ‘[the U.S.] violates national sovereignty; you do what you want; this is contrary to international law and you don’t care. That’s a little hypocritical,’” Lewis said, “but this is the U.N. after all. The Russians and Chinese want to really damage the U.S., to destroy the system of international relations we’ve created and undo a lot of things we’ve done since the Cold War.”

The takeaway, Lewis said, is that the world’s a long way from agreeing on basic principles of cyber sovereignty and those principles may not be written on U.S. terms.

“We’ve assumed that countries have a common understanding of how the world works and this shows that’s increasingly not the case,” he said.

Lewis added that the Russian delegation requested that another GGE be held in 2016.

“The Russians seem to think they have the upper hand and they think they can dominate another GGE and get it to endorse what they want, so that’s a dilemma,” he said. “They’re probably not wrong, but it’s not as easy as they make out.”

As rapporteur, Lewis’ job was to be a neutral arbiter helping the delegates reach consensus.

The State Department official described the document’s international law section as “a very worthwhile step forward from 2013” but also “more ambiguous than we would have liked.”

“Certain countries had always been sensitive about being more specific and that sensitivity continued,” the official added.

The agreement on norms that the U.S. government has successfully lobbied for, however, suggests the U.S. does maintain significant influence in the world of cyber diplomacy, despite anger over larger foreign policy issues, analysts said.

“Even in the face of all the ways these countries can distrust each other, we still have stuff to agree on,” said Jason Healey, a senior fellow and former director at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative. “That, to me, is really the important message out of this. As crappy as the world has been the last two years … that we can still find stuff to agree on is a wonderful bellwether for maybe we’re starting to come to terms and have more agreement on this.”

An interagency group in the U.S. government adopted the three norms as official government policy earlier this year along with a fourth stating the U.S. will not use cyber surveillance to steal information about foreign companies to benefit U.S. firms — something the U.S. has frequently accused the Chinese of doing, including in indictments against five members of the People’s Liberation Army last year.

Secretary of State John Kerry also outlined similar principles during an address in Seoul May 18. That address also prominently criticized North Korea for its 2014 cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment.

The GGE report also includes meaty sections about confidence building measures nations can take in cyberspace, the State Department official said, and on helping developing nations build digital infrastructure and Computer Emergency Response Teams.

“Parts of this were highly contested, but, all in all, [we’re] pleased with most of it,” the official said.

The development of peacetime norms may ultimately be more important than establishing how international law applies during armed conflict, said Catherine Lotrionte, director of Georgetown University’s Institute for Law, Science and Global Security and former assistant general counsel at the CIA.

That’s because the majority of current cyber conflict takes place beneath the level of armed conflict.

Lotrionte urged more specificity on how the norms would apply, for example, by outlining precisely what assistance nations should offer other nations investigating cyberattacks.

When Russia pummeled Estonia with cyberattacks in 2007, she noted, Estonia asked Russia to investigate the attack under an existing mutual legal assistance treaty. Russian officials declined, she said, saying their reading of the MLAT’s wording did not obligate them to assist in that instance.

The adoption of the norms also marks the latest in a string of cyber policy victories by the Obama administration, Healey noted, even as it’s been less successful at warding off cyberattacks from its own networks. In particular, he said, violation of the norms could be used to justify imposing cyber-specific sanctions recently developed by the Treasury Department.

“I’ve been a critic of the White House because I want to see a slugger come in and aim for the fences and the White House has been playing small ball, just a little bit at a time,” Healey said. “But they’ve been getting runs across the plate.”

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Small Gulf War in ASIA : Yemen:

Yeman war
Yeman war

 One more small Gulf War in ASIA : Yemen: It is between No nuclear and nuclear powers, poverty , tribal and Sects etc

Why Yeman is Important to Saudi : It is to safe guard Macca and world of Rulers and king doms with strong tribal record rather than loose tribes .  Divide regions tribes to safe gaurd power and prosperity .

  • Yemen  : Country in Asia
  • Yemen, officially known as the Republic of Yemen, is an Arab country in Southwest Asia, occupying the southwestern to southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen is the second largest country in the peninsula, occupying 527,970 km². Wikipedia
  • Currency: Yemeni rial
  • The logic is it is war between Sunnis , shias , tribes for money and poverty of Gulf regions.  The resources in gulf region , power struggle from old and new way of thinking of youth and destruction of culture and ancient history is root cause for these wars.
  • If we see world histories ,cultures ,civilizations the barbarians or attackers from west , east  fought cruel wars and un ethical wars.
  • This made civilizations to destroy through looting , rapes , murders , destroying houses , books , temples , mosques , churches , great architectural buildings , looting gold diamonds , animals ,  resources ,  landscapes , forts  etc.
  • Terror , rape destruction , killing young children , brain washing young youth made new world wars across the world .
  • classic example is youth , woman fighting in Syria and also LTTE war in Srilanka exposed new type of war fares for liberation , destruction of scoietes at the cost of others.
  • In the name of democracy and Dictator ships the world is divided to kill mother earth.
  • Resources and population will fight with each other . the next wars will be for water , food , jobs and races based on their own localities. every body want to become leader , god of the district.
  • The small empires cities districts counties etc will fight with each other based on local lords or mafia for power.
  • Divide and rule for power and money will become key for all human beings at the cost of others
  • The recent classic example is division of state andhra pradesh into for looting is key case study. around 40 million people effected with this genocide. Around 40 billion looted from south India. Gas , Coal , Iron ore  ,  Red sandalwood etc
  • The global human trafficking with these wars is reached into billions and also rebuilding of countries is new mode of business for global real estate , construction companies , oil companies  Defense companies , trans port companies etc will make more money at the cost of human life.
  • In one way population growth will come down at the cost of so many lifes
  • Global ebola viruses will become more active in refugee camps,
  • This is cycle with world is flat the wars in any part of the world will effect global countries and also economies.
  • Sanctions on each other with wars and in the name of mass destruction will lead new down fall of global economies.
  • One more statics for War of mass dist-ructions : history : IRAQ IRAN wars ,Libya, syria wars , Russia ukrane wars , Europe wars  , india pakistan wars , UK flak land wars,
  • South Amir ca and Africa poverty wars.
  • @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
  • China: About 250 total warheads.

    France: 290 deployed warheads.

    Russia: According to the September 2014 New START numbers, Russia has 1,643 strategic warheads deployed on 528 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers [1]. The Federation of American Scientists estimates Russia has several thousand nondeployed strategic warheads and approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads. An additional 3,700 are awaiting dismantlement.

    United Kingdom: About 120 strategic warheads, of which no more than 40 are deployed at sea at any given time. The total stockpile is up to 225 weapons.

    United States: According to the September 2014 New START declaration, the United States has 1,642 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 794 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers [1].  The Federation of American Scientists estimates that the United States’ nondeployed strategic arsenal is approximately 2,800 warheads and the U.S. tactical nuclear arsenal numbers 500 warheads. In total, the U.S. has about 4,800 nuclear warheads [2], including tactical, strategic, and nondeployed weapons. Additional warheads are retired and await dismantlement.


    Non-NPT Nuclear Weapons Possessors:

    Three states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—never joined the NPT and are known to possess nuclear weapons. Claiming its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, India first tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974. That test spurred Pakistan to ramp up work on its secret nuclear weapons program. India and Pakistan both publicly demonstrated their nuclear weapon capabilities with a round of tit-for-tat nuclear tests in May 1998. Israel has not publicly conducted a nuclear test, does not admit to or deny having nuclear weapons, and states that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Nevertheless, Israel is universally believed to possess nuclear arms, although it is unclear how many weapons Israel possesses. The following arsenal estimates are based on the amount of fissile material—highly enriched uranium and plutonium—that each of the states is estimated to have produced. Fissile material is the key element for making nuclear weapons. India and Israel are believed to use plutonium in their weapons, while Pakistan is thought to use highly enriched uranium.

    India: Between 90-110 nuclear warheads.
    Israel: Between 80-100 nuclear warheads, with fissile material for up to 200.
    Pakistan: Between 100 to 120 nuclear warheads.


    States of Immediate Proliferation Concern:

    Iran is pursuing a uranium-enrichment program and other projects that could provide it with the capability to produce bomb-grade fissile material and develop nuclear weapons within the next several years. In contrast, North Korea has the material to produce a small number of nuclear weapons, announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and tested nuclear devices. Uncertainty persists about how many additional nuclear devices North Korea has assembled beyond those it has tested. In September 2005, Pyongyang “committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.”

    Iran: No known weapons or sufficient fissile material stockpiles to build weapons. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the institution charged with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in 2003 that Iran had undertaken covert nuclear activities to establish the capacity to indigenously produce fissile material. The IAEA is continuing its investigation and monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear program.

    North Korea: Has separated enough plutonium for roughly 6-8 nuclear warheads. North Korea unveiled a centrifuge facility in 2010, buts ability to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons remains unclear. In August 2013, North Korea restarted the heavy-water reactor it used to extract plutonium in the past for its nuclear warheads, although operation of the reactor since August has not been constant. Experts estimate it will be about 18 months before the first new bomb-ready plutonium will be separated from the spent fuel.

    Syria: In September 2007, Israel conducted an airstrike on what U.S. officials have alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor. Intelligence officials briefed members of congress on the airstrike eight months later in April 2008, discussing the evidence leading to their judgment that the site was an undeclared nuclear reactor. While the extent of Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation is unclear, it is believed to have begun in 1997. Subsequent IAEA investigations into the U.S. claims uncovered traces of undeclared man-made uranium particles at both the site of the destroyed facility and Syria’s declared research reactor. Syria has failed to provide adequate cooperation to the IAEA in order to clarify the nature of the destroyed facility and procurement efforts that could be related to a nuclear program.

 

Digital manufacturing is likely to be one of the key disruptive technologies of the 21st century. Described by The Economist as the foundation of a third industrial revolution, [1] digital manufacturing enables individuals and communities of designers to manufacture products themselves rather than relying on large factories with global supply chains.

While digital manufacturing holds significant potential as an engine of economic change, its potential effects on the proliferation of missiles and other weapons has not been adequately explored. The production and proliferation of missiles is foundationally an industrial process. Developing missile capability currently requires specialized industrial capabilities and expertise. Proliferation involves worldwide supply and transport chains similar to that of any modern globalized industry, albeit operating in secret. Just as digital manufacturing is likely to change the way household goods are produced, it will affect how missiles and other weapons are developed and proliferated.

What is Digital Manufacturing?

Digital manufacturing combines desktop design software – the sort that can be run from your home computer- and both traditional and new manufacturing equipment including 3D printers, Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines that use digital instructions to operate a variety of cutting and millings tools, and laser cutters.

Digital manufacturing begins with software. Using software that has been used by industrial designers for decades, one can design and render a 3D model of the object for production. Designers need not start from scratch. The open source movement- a worldwide movement of inventors, programmers and designers who make their work available to others free of charge- provides a wide range of designs that can be directly manufactured or built on to create custom designs for particular needs.   Designers can also take advantage of 3D scanners which can make a digital model of a physical object, saving the designer the trouble of redesigning the object from scratch and allowing the production of exceedingly exact copies.[2]

The designer can then upload their work to digital manufacturing machines that can craft a range of products. 3D printers have received the lion’s share of attention in popular press due to the novel way they function. Rather than subtracting mass from a piece of raw material by cutting or molding, it adds material together to create a product. Printers equipped with print heads similar to the one of desktop inkjet printers spray layers of plastic to create products. More advanced machines use lasers to harden powder or liquid in layers to create objects, and can fashion products out of a wide range of metals including steel and titanium. CNC machines can be equipped with various tools that allow them to cut or mill a block of material into a desired shape or product. Laser cutters slice sheets of metal or wood into 2-dimensional objects and components. [3]

Digital manufacturing inverts traditional industrial mass production. Mass production creates very large numbers of identical objects. Digital manufacturing tools are more flexible- each machine can be used to produce a wide range of objects without requiring the often expensive and lengthy retooling traditional mass production would require. As digitally manufactured objects are produced individually there are no additional costs for additional complexity or customization in an object, allowing products to be designed to fit extremely specific requirements. This individualized production, however, means that digital manufacturing doesn’t capture the economies of scale seen in traditional mass production- the 100th or 1000th digitally manufactured object will cost as much as the first, whereas mass production requires a significant upfront investment that pays for itself over the manufacture of many hundreds or thousands of copies of a product.[4]

Another advantage of digital manufacturing is that it enables local production. A file can be sent to a digital manufacturing machine anywhere in the world and produce an object on demand. Rather than outsourcing the manufacture of a product to a factory in China or elsewhere in the world (a process that can take weeks or months and introduces significant supply chain risks), a designer or customer can immediately make a product to meet a local need. The localization of manufacturing is potentially one of the most important effects of digital manufacturing as it could shift manufacturing (and manufacturing jobs) away from China and other low-cost global powerhouses back to the West and to local markets. The local advantage of digital manufacturing, beyond potentially changing the nature of the global economy, also encourages the spread of digital manufacturing capabilities. As 3D printers and other machines become available in local economies throughout the world, they will also become increasingly available to state and non-state actors who could harness them to produce missiles and other weapons.

The automotive and aerospace industries have been early adopters of digital manufacturing technologies.  Ford uses 3D printers for rapid prototyping of automobile parts.[5]  In 2012, GE Aviation purchased Morris Technologies, a company heavily invested in 3D printing and other digital manufacturing technologies, which produces components for commercial jet engines. 3D printing reduces the amount and weight of the material in these engine parts, resulting in a more efficient jet engine.[6] On a grander scale, Airbus is reported to be developing a 3D printer large enough to manufacture entire aircraft wings.[7]

Digital manufacturing has also been embraced by the U.S military. The U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command uses computer design software, 3D scanners, and 3D printers for the development and rapid prototyping of equipment before it is mass produced using conventional manufacturing techniques.[8] Starting in 2012, mobile laboratories equipped with digital manufacturing capabilities have been forward deployed to support the logistics needs of troops in Afghanistan.[9] The mobile labs allow the U.S. Army’s Rapid Equipping Force to manufacture spare parts and new components in Afghanistan based on collaborations from designers and engineers both in the United States and deployed in Afghanistan.

Printing Missiles

The proliferation of missiles and other complex systems is, at heart, an industrial process. Digital manufacturing will disrupt that process and allow for the production of more effective missile components, using a wider variety of facilities and equipment, by a larger number of actors. Digital manufacturing tools themselves would not be capable of producing a complete missile but they could be used to fabricate many key missile components, thereby reducing the challenge faced by a new weapons state from the manufacture of a weapon from scratch to the simpler assembly of a missile from its digitally produced parts.

Digital manufacturing can be used to produce components for missiles that are more effective than those produced by traditional industrial processes. NASA is currently using selective laser melting, a process similar to 3D printing which uses a laser to harden layers of metallic powder into an object, to produce components for the Space Launch System(SLS). The SLS is a heavy lift rocket intended to carry robotic and manned missions to “nearby asteroids and eventually to Mars.”[10] As digital manufacturing allows rocket components to be produced in a single piece, rather than welding together smaller parts produced using traditional processes, the components are stronger and more resilient increasing the reliability of the launch vehicle. Digital manufacturing would likely produce similar benefits for the production of components for ballistic missiles, which share many common features with space launch vehicles.

Missile warheads and fuel may also be made more effective by digital manufacturing. 3D printing could be used to produce warheads with specific geometries that would produce enhanced effects when detonated.[11] Similar methods could also be used to produce propellants shaped to provide better and more efficient burn rates for rockets and ammunition. [12]

A greater proportion of digital manufacturing equipment than its traditional industrial counterparts will be dual-use technology. Digital manufacturing tools are inherently flexible and can produce a wide range of products without requiring retooling or other substantial modification. Governments and non-state actors could take advantage of civilian digital manufacturing capabilities to produce components for missiles and other weapons systems without needing to modify the equipment or the facilities that house it. The number of facilities that could be used for proliferation activities would be significantly greater making detecting and tracking a missile program more difficult. This would also complicate efforts to disable or delay a missile program through sabotage or an overt military attack. Lastly, the greater number of proliferation-sensitive facilities would make transparency and confidence building more difficult even in the absence of intent to acquire missiles or other weapons.

Digital manufacturing would also allow proliferators to better leverage limited human capital. Design software requires less expertise to use than traditional design methods.  Digital manufacturing systems themselves are automated, reducing the number of skilled machinists and technicians needed to produce missile components. [13] While the assembly and integration of components into a functioning missile system would still require a pool of experienced engineers and technicians, proliferators would still require less design and production expertise than traditional industrial production processes would demand.

Digital manufacturing would also benefit non-state proliferators. Non-state actors generally lack access to facilities to produce anything beyond crude artillery rockets and depend on support from state sponsors. As digital manufacturing capabilities become increasingly available throughout the world, non-state actors will be able to access local manufacturing capabilities to produce weapons based on designs provided by their state benefactors or to improve home built capabilities. Hamas, for instance, has made extensive use of crude artillery rockets, the accuracy and effectiveness of which would be significantly improved if engine parts and other components currently made with drills and lathes were produced with greater precision by digital manufacturing machines.

Online Proliferation

A key advantage of digital manufacturing is the ability to easily convert a design from a file directly into a physical object. As cyber-crime, efforts to crack down on software and music piracy and Wikileaks have demonstrated, information is very difficult to protect, contain, and control. Rather than attempting to prevent the shipment of missiles or components from states like North Korea or Iran to new weapons states or non-state actors, the non-proliferation regime will be faced with the problem of controlling the movement of information. It would most likely be easier for North Korea, for instance, to transfer data to allow a customer to manufacture missile components using local digital manufacturing facilities than to ship missiles or components that could be tracked and intercepted as they traveled from Northeast Asia to the Middle East or other hotspots. A proliferating state could leverage digital manufacturing to shift its business model to the sale of weapon design information rather than complete weapons or to reduce the scale of shipments to make them more difficult to track.

Digital manufacturing is also deeply linked with the open source hardware movement which has developed tools to allow for the easy sharing of hardware designs as well as collaboration on new projects. This approach has been adopted for military projects in the United States; the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) currently sponsors a project to design a new amphibious tank for the U.S. Marine Corp that uses online collaboration tools to allow far flung networks of researchers to collaborate on designs. [14] Similar tools would facilitate collaboration among global proliferation networks such as the Iranian-North Korean partnership for the development of ballistic missiles.[15] Non-state actors could also use such tools to leverage the efforts of sympathetic engineers and designers throughout the world. Proliferators could also take advantage of the blueprints made available by members of the open-source movement elsewhere in the world.  Designers with an interest in space systems or aerodynamics could unwittingly provide assistance to a foreign missile design program.[16]

Proliferators could also benefit from design information from Western governments and industry. The computer networks of the U.S. government and defense contractors are frequent targets of cyber-attacks from a variety of sources. While technical specifications and other design information obtained via cyber-espionage would already be useful to proliferators, digital manufacturing would exacerbate this vulnerability. Designs intended for digital manufacture – either for rapid prototyping or for the production of final components – would be easier for proliferators to use. Rather than needing to interpret and replicate the production of a component or system from stolen design files, proliferators could simply enter the data into compatible digital manufacturing machines to produce an exact physical copy of the stolen design.

Beyond Missiles

Digital manufacturing has security implications beyond missile proliferation. The information sharing and streamlined production processes that make the proliferation of missiles easier could also enable nuclear proliferation. Digital manufacturing would have little effect on the production of nuclear weapons themselves or their requirement for significant quantities of highly enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium. The design and production of uranium enrichment centrifuges and other equipment necessary for a nuclear program, however, would be simplified by digital manufacturing much as missile production would be.

Digital manufacturing could also be used to produce small arms. Open source networks are collaborating on the design of small arms including Defense Distributed, a U.S. based group that is working to design and produce 3D printable firearms including the controversial AR-15 rifle.[17] As digital manufacturing becomes more widespread such projects will serve to significantly undermine domestic gun control laws as well as undercut international efforts to control the trade in small arms.

The manufacture of spare parts, as currently undertaken by the U.S. military, could also serve to undermine sanctions regimes intended to curtail proliferation. Iran, for instance, has a significant number of aircraft and weapons systems obtained from the West before the Islamic Revolution.  While Iran’s F-14 fighter aircraft are less capable than the most advanced aircraft flown by the United States and its regional allies, they could still pose a potent threat. The difficulty in obtaining spare parts and other maintenance supplies from the U.S. has grounded most of the Iranian Air Force’s F-14s and forced Iran to develop clandestine networks to secretly obtain spare parts under the cover of legitimate business deals.[18] In the future, a state placed under an arms embargo could use digital files- obtained legally before the sanctions or clandestinely afterwards- or 3D scans of existing components to produce new parts and maintain their military capabilities despite sanctions.

Proliferation in the Digital Future

Digital manufacturing will change the production and proliferation of missiles and other weapons in much the same way it will transform civilian industries. Rather than depending on a small number of states with the capability and will to proliferate missile systems or technologies, state and non-state actors will be able to leverage the civilian manufacturing sector and global networks of missile expertise to obtain weapons.

This new industrial model for proliferation will require new concepts for counter-proliferation. Missile and other weapons technologies will be available to a wider number of actors. Future counter-proliferation efforts will be faced with less visible footprints for missile production and ethereal web-based networks of missile expertise and data proliferation. Non-proliferation and cyber security experts will need to collaborate to understand how to track and defeat the information sharing capabilities that digital manufacturing enables. Stopping the flow of missile technology around the world has been a difficult task faced with many setbacks. As digital manufacturing comes of age, preventing further missile proliferation will only become more difficult.

 

Matthew Hallex is a defense analyst who lives and works in northern Virginia.  He holds a Masters in Security Policy Studies from George Washington University.

 


[1] “The third industrial revolution.” The Economist, April 21, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21553017

[2] Chris Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution.  New York: Crown Business, 2012,  97-98.

[3] Anderson, 82-84.

[4] Anderson, 88-89;   Thomas Campbell, Christopher Williams, Olga Ivanova, and Banning Garrett, “Could 3D Printing Change the World?” Atlantic Council, October 2011, available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/101711_ACUS_3DPrinting.PDF, 6.

[5] Juho Vesanto, “Ford Using 3D Printing for Prototyping,” 3D Printing Industry, January 8, 2013. http://3dprintingindustry.com/2013/01/08/ford-using-3d-printing-for-prototyping/.

[6] “Additive manufacturing :Print me a jet engine,” The Economist, November 22, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/11/additive-manufacturing; Mark Fleming, “3D printing to make jet engines lighter, more efficient,” 3D Printer, July 13, 2012.http://www.3dprinter.net/3d-printing-make-ge-jet-engines-lighter-efficient.

[7] Campbell et al., 11.

[8] David McNally, “Army researchers use cutting edge 3D printers,” U.S. Army, October 3, 2012. http://www.army.mil/article/88464/.

[9] Matthew Cox, “Mobile Labs Build On-the-Spot Combat Solutions,” Military.com, August 17, 2012. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/08/17/mobile-labs-build-on-the-spot-combat-solutions.html; Jon R. Drushal & Michael Llenza, “3-D Printing Revolution in Military Logistics,” New Atlanticist, November 20, 2012. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/3-d-printing-revolution-military-logistics.

[10] Bill Hubscher, “NASA’s Space Launch System Using Futuristic Technology to Build the Next Generation of Rockets,” NASA, November 6, 2012. http://www.nasa.gov/exploration/systems/sls/selective_melting.html.

[11] Kenneth G. Gousman, Scott D. VanWeelden & Brian T. Rosenberger, 2006.  Warhead with integral, direct-manufactured features. U.S Patent 7093542, filed on April 22, 2004, and issued August 22, 2006.

[12]Mike Llenza, “3D Printing and the Future of Naval Logistics,” Disruptive Thinkers, March 9, 2013.  http://disruptivethinkers.org/3d-printing-and-the-future-of-naval-logistics

[13]Campbell, et al., 6.

[14] Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Wanna Build A Tank? DARPA Offers $4M Prize For Marine Amphib,” AOL Defense, October 2, 2012, http://defense.aol.com/2012/10/02/wanna-build-a-tank-darpa-offers-1m-prize-for-marine-amphib/.

[15] John S. Park, “The Leap in North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor,” NBR Analysis Brief, December 19, 2012, available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Brief/121812_Park_NKoreaMissile.pdf.

[16] Adam Mann, “Open-Sourcing Outer Space: 3-D Printing Meets Rocket Science,” Wired, March 8, 2013. http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/03/3-d-printed-rocket-engines/.

[17] Robert Beckhusen, “Watch the New and Improved Printable Gun Spew Hundreds of Bullets,” Wired, February 28, 2013.  http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/02/printable-receiver/; “Our Plan,” Defense Distributed, http://defensedistributed.com/proofgun-2/.[18] “F-14 Parts, Anyone?,” Bloomberg BusinessWeek, June 10, 2007. http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-06-10/f-14-parts-anyone.

Petition signing in Tshwane
Petition signing in Tshwane (Photo credit: Agang SA)
Human Rights
Human Rights (Photo credit: h de c)
National Security Action Memorandum No. 176 Re...
National Security Action Memorandum No. 176 Release of Public Information Concerning Soviet Nuclear Tests – NARA – 193562 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
National Security Action Memorandum No. 11 Inf...
National Security Action Memorandum No. 11 Information on the Progress of Negotiations with Germans on Increasing… – NARA – 193411 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
English: US National Security medal.
English: US National Security medal. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The seal of the U.S. National Security Agency....
The seal of the U.S. National Security Agency. The first use was in September 1966, replacing an older seal which was used briefly. For more information, see here and here. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

GLOBAL PRINCIPLES ON

NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

(“THE TSHWANE PRINCIPLES”)

Finalized in Tshwane, South Africa

Issued on 12 June 2013

INTRODUCTION

These Principles were developed in order to provide guidance to those engaged in drafting, revising, or implementing laws or provisions relating to the state’s authority to withhold information on national security grounds or to punish the disclosure of such information.

They are based on international (including regional) and national law, standards, good practices, and the writings of experts.

They address national security—rather than all grounds for withholding information. All other public grounds for restricting access should at least meet these standards.

These Principles were drafted by 22 organizations and academic centres (listed in the Annex) in consultation with more than 500 experts from more than 70 countries at 14 meetings held around the world, facilitated by the Open Society Justice Initiative, and in consultation with the four special rapporteurs on freedom of expression and/or media freedom and the special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights:

 the United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression,

 the UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights,

 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,

 the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and

 the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media.

BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

National security and the public’s right to know are often viewed as pulling in opposite directions. While there is at times a tension between a government’s desire to keep information secret on national security grounds and the public’s right to information held by public authorities, a clear-eyed review of recent history suggests that legitimate national security interests are, in practice, best protected when the public is well informed about the state’s activities, including those undertaken to protect national security. ii

Access to information, by enabling public scrutiny of state action, not only safeguards against abuse by public officials but also permits the public to play a role in determining the policies of the state and thereby forms a crucial component of genuine national security, democratic participation, and sound policy formulation. In order to protect the full exercise of human rights, in certain circumstances it may be necessary to keep information secret to protect legitimate national security interests.

Striking the right balance is made all the more challenging by the fact that courts in many countries demonstrate the least independence and greatest deference to the claims of government when national security is invoked. This deference is reinforced by provisions in the security laws of many countries that trigger exceptions to the right to information as well as to ordinary rules of evidence and rights of the accused upon a minimal showing, or even the mere assertion by the government, of a national security risk. A government’s over-invocation of national security concerns can seriously undermine the main institutional safeguards against government abuse: independence of the courts, the rule of law, legislative oversight, media freedom, and open government.

These Principles respond to the above-described longstanding challenges as well as to the fact that, in recent years, a significant number of states around the world have embarked on adopting or revising classification regimes and related laws. This trend in turn has been sparked by several developments. Perhaps most significant has been the rapid adoption of access to information laws since the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the result that, as of the date that these Principles were issued, more than 5.2 billion people in 95 countries around the world enjoy the right of access to information—at least in law, if not in practice. People in these countries are—often for the first time—grappling with the question of whether and under what circumstances information may be kept secret. Other developments contributing to an increase in proposed secrecy legislation have been government responses to terrorism or the threat of terrorism, and an interest in having secrecy regulated by law in the context of democratic transitions. Continue reading GLOBAL PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION